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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the performance of distribution networks as the result of a range of 
organizational choices made by the upstream firm. The analytical part of the paper surveys the 
vast literature devoted to franchising and to dual distribution. From this framework, several 
testable propositions are derived, linking the networks performance to the organizational 
choices. Three complementary criteria of performance are taken into account: the 
internationalization rate, the expansion rate, the market share. The paper provides evidence 
that these criteria are empirically related. Thus, a system of simultaneous equations is defined, 
free of endogeneity relating to the explanatory variables. The estimations on recent French 
data by means of the  three-least squares method provide robust results, and show that the 
type of distribution network, the number of company-owned units in the network,  the type of 
sector, and the choice to manage several networks simultaneously affect the performance in 
distribution systems. 
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Performance in distribution systems: 
What is the influence of the upstream firm‘s organizational choices? 
 
1. Introduction 
Organizational forms in distribution systems are the subject of a vast empirical literature on 
franchise data, and constitute an ongoing issue, as demonstrated by several recent publications 
(Kosova et al. 2012; Cliquet and Pénard, 2012; Kashyap and Sivadas, 2012; Pénard et al. 
2011; Barthélémy, 2011). In line with studies focusing on the influence of the organizational 
choices on the performance at the network level (initially, over the last ten years: Sorenson 
and Sorensen, 2000; Shane, 2001; Azoulay and Shane 2001), this paper provides several new 
empirical results leading to managerial and conceptual implications. 
A survey of the recent literature reveals that there is no unique criterion regarding the 
performance of distribution networks. As showed by Table 1, the empirical dedicated studies 
over the period 2007-2012 can be classified in three main categories: one category dealing 
with the financial performances, the other one with the non-financial performances, and a 
third category of empirical works combining financial and non financial performance criteria. 
In the first field relating to the financial performances, Barthélemy (2008) focuses on the 
impact of the network resources and the governance structure on the financial performance of 
the chain. This author uses as performance criteria a combination of return on sales (ROS) 
and return on assets (ROA).  Perdreau et al. (2010) study the financial performances (ROA) 
resulting from plural forms in franchising chains. Taking into account the mean turnover for 
each network, Chaudey and Fadairo (2010) highlight the positive influence of more 
constraining contracts for the retailers. Madanoglu et al. (2011) analyze whether franchising 
units achieve a better financial performance than non-franchising ones.  
In the second field, Vasquez (2007) evaluates the impact of the annual growth in retail 
outlets on the networks performance outcomes. Kidwell et al. (2007) study the influence of 
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the free riding behaviors on the franchisees performances, and highlight prejudicial effects. 
Gillis and Combs (2009) provide evidence that the agency theory offers an interesting 
explanation for firms’ franchising decisions and performances. Jeon et al. (2010) measure the 
franchise success by the number of operating outlets, while Mellewigt et al.  (2011) draw 
attention to the relationship between the performance of franchise systems and the satisfaction 
of the franchisees and the employee-managers. 
A few studies combine both types of criteria. This is the case with Dada and Watson 
(2011), Grünhagen et al. (2012), Kosova et al. (2012). Dada and Watson (2011) analyze the 
impact of the franchisor's perception on the entrepreneurial strategy orientations and the 
performance outcomes. More recently, Grünhagen et al. (2012) focus on the opposing forces 
relating to standardization and innovation system, and on their result regarding the 
performance of franchise chains. Kosova et al. (2012) highlight the differences in outcomes 
between franchised and corporate hotels from data concerning a large multi-chain hotel 
company. The performance outcomes are measured in terms of prices, occupancy rate and 
revenues per room. 
 
Table 1 
Recent empirical studies dealing with performance in distribution networks (2007-2012) 
 
 
Year 
 
Author (s) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimation 
Method 
Analytical 
Framework 
2012 Grünhagen 
Dada 
Wollan 
Watson 
Financial and non 
financial 
performance 
Moderated 
regression 
Managerial 
orientation 
 
2012 
 
Kosova 
Lafontaine 
Perrigot  
 
Financial and non 
financial 
performance 
Panel data 
OLS 
Quantile 
regression 
Agency and other 
theories of 
industrial 
organization 
 
2011 Madanoglu 
Lee   
Castrogiovanni 
 
Financial 
performance 
 
Panel Data 
Agency theory 
Resource scarcity 
theory 
 
2011 
 
Mellewigt 
Ehrmann 
Decker 
 
Non financial  
(satisfaction) 
 
OLS 
 
Agency theory 
 
2011 
 
Dada 
Watson 
Financial and non 
financial 
performance 
OLS Managerial 
orientation 
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2010 
 
Jeon 
Dant 
Baker 
Non financial  
(number 
of operating 
Units) 
 
OLS 
 
Managerial 
orientation 
 
2010 
 
Chaudey. 
Fadairo 
 
Financial  
(mean turnover) 
2 steps 
Heckman 
method 
 
Agency theory 
 
2010 
 
Perdreau 
Le Nadant 
Clicquet 
Financial 
performance 
(ROA) 
 
Panel Data 
Agency theory 
Resource scarcity 
theory 
 
2009 
 
Gillis 
Combs 
Non financial 
(propensity to 
franchise) 
 
OLS 
 
Agency theory 
 
 
2008 
 
Barthélemy 
 
Financial 
performance 
(ROA, ROS) 
 
 
OLS 
Tobit 
Agency theory 
Resource scarcity 
theory 
2007  
Vazquez 
Non financial 
(percentage 
of franchised 
outlets) 
 
OLS 
Agency theory 
Resource scarcity 
theory 
2007 Kidwell 
Nygaard 
Silkoset 
 
Non financial 
(perceived 
performance) 
 
Structural 
model 
 
Agency theory 
 
Our study takes place in the second field of this empirical literature, and values networks 
performance with non-financial variables. The originality of our approach is to use three 
different and complementary criteria as indicators of the same latent variable, namely the 
distribution networks performance. More precisely, in this paper, the performance of 
distribution networks is measured with: the market share, the expansion rate, and the 
internationalization rate. 
The paper demonstrates the empirical relationships between these performance criteria. In 
addition, while instrumental variables are not available due to the cross-sectional data, a 
specific methodology is developed here to deal with the endogeneity problems, inherent to the 
issue of the paper.  
Indeed, as mentioned by Kosova et al. (2012), Yvrande-Billon and Saussier (2004), 
studying performance as the result of strategic choices raises a problem of endogeneity. Many 
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factors may influence both the performance and the organizational choices. For this reason, 
managerial decisions are usually endogenous to their expected performance outcomes. 
In this paper, the econometrical model takes the form of a system of simultaneous 
equations, free of endogeneity regarding the explanatory variables. The model is estimated on 
recent and good quality primary data, provided by the French National Institute of Statistics 
and Economic Studies (INSEE). The diversity of organizational forms in the French system 
provides a good opportunity to study the impact of the organizational choices on networks 
performance. Five types of distribution networks are distinguished in our sample, regarding a 
wide range of retail and services sectors. The estimation results highlight the influence of the 
organizational choices on networks performances. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research model. The literature 
dealing with franchising and plural forms networks constitutes the analytical background. 
Section 3 describes the data and the study variables. Evidence for the relationships between 
the three performance indicators is given in section 4. Section 5 contains the estimations 
regarding the determinants of networks performance. Finally, section 6 offers a general 
discussion. 
 
2. The research model 
The literature dedicated to the organizational forms in distribution networks highlights the 
interest of franchising and of plural forms networks. Plural forms organization refers to the 
simultaneous presence of both franchised and company-owned outlets in the same network. 
The brand-name value plays also an important role in distribution networks where the 
downstream units share a same brand-name and a same concept defined and promoted by the 
upstream firm. 
Three testable propositions linking networks performance to organizational choices derive 
from this analytical framework, presented in greater detail in the following. 
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2.1. Franchising and performance in distribution networks  
Several analytical contexts justify franchising as a retail strategy. The resource scarcity view, 
initially developed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), Caves and Murphy (1976), Lafontaine and 
Kaufmann (1994), focuses on the resource constraints of the upstream firm. Franchisees are 
seen as financial and human capital providers that enable quick growth of the network. Hence, 
the exploitation of a brand name through independent retailers instead of company-owned 
units is analyzed as an efficient governance strategy of the upstream firm, the goal being a 
rapid expansion of the network. 
The agency theory offers another and complementary explanation for franchising, based on 
the seminal contributions of Mathewson and Winter (1984; 1985), Tirole (1988). These 
authors analyze the moral hazard within the relationship between producers and retailers: the 
producer cannot observe the sales effort of the retailer, while the retailer’s actions affect the 
profit of the upstream firm.  In this analytical context, the moral hazard is related to a range of 
externalities regarding the relationships in a distribution network. Providing the first 
formalized analysis of franchising in the agency framework, Mathewson and Winter (1985) 
highlight the importance of the vertical externality as the main explanation for franchising. 
Their agency model demonstrates that every action of the downstream firm affecting the level 
of the final demand impacts the producer’s profit. Organizing a profit-sharing between two 
independent firms, the franchise contract provides a better incentive structure compared to 
company-owned retail units. Therefore, due to the vertical externality and the moral hazard on 
the downstream side, franchising networks have better incentive properties than vertically 
integrated networks. 
This analytical context underlying the interest of franchising to resolve resource scarcity 
and agency issues is the framework of recent empirical works on US data (Combs et al., 2004; 
Castrogiovanni et al., 2006; Michael and Combs, 2008), or on European data (Barthélemy, 
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2008; Dahlstrom et al., 2009; Arrunada et al. 2009). Moreover, Barthélemy (2008) provides 
evidence that financial performance actually depends on the governance structure of 
distribution networks; Arrunada et al. (2009) show that franchised units perform better than 
company-owned units in terms of productivity, labor costs, and profitability. 
Based on this background literature, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. Franchise contracts provide higher resources and incentives; therefore franchising 
networks generate a higher performance. 
 
2.2. Plural forms and performance in distribution networks 
The literature dealing with the organizational design of franchised chains emphasizes the 
interest of plural forms networks which include a proportion of company-owned outlets. 
While the coexistence of franchised and company-owned units in the same network has long 
been considered as a transitory phenomenon, it is now clearly established that the proportion 
of company-owned outlets remains relatively stable in mature franchised chains (Lafontaine 
and Shaw, 2005). Such empirical evidence suggests that dual distribution, mixing vertically 
integrated and independent retail units as franchised ones, is strategically employed by the 
upstream firm.  
In a recent theoretical work, Pénard et al. (2011) demonstrate that, in a context of 
asymmetric information and moral hazards, plural forms is an efficient and stable 
organizational choice. The agency framework has previously been used by Bai and Tao 
(2000) to study dual distribution. Adapting the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s multitasks 
model, Bai and Tao (2000) draw attention to the complementarities between company-owned 
units and independent retailers coexisting in the same network. With dual distribution, each 
type of downstream unit is devoted to a specific task; owned units being more involved in the 
promotion of the common brand while franchised units would be more involved in sales 
efforts.  
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Most of the empirical works on plural forms in franchising are developed in line with 
Bradach (1998)’s model (Ehrmann et al., 2004; Dant et al., 2008; Cliquet and Pénard, 2012). 
In this seminal work, Bradach (1998) argues that franchise systems use plural forms because 
the existence of each type of outlet (franchised versus company-owned) in the same network 
positively impacts the management of the other side of the business. The author highlights 
four challenges for a franchisor to successfully manage distribution networks. They show that 
for each of them dual distribution is more efficient than the other organizational forms. 
Bradach (1998)’s analysis has recently been empirically tested on French data by Cliquet and 
Pénard (2012) who provide an empirical support to the conceptual model justifying the 
interest of plural forms organizations. Cliquet and Pénard (2012) show that the four 
designated challenges, namely network expansion, concept uniformity, local responsiveness, 
and network adaptation, actually drive the statutory choices in franchised networks. 
From this previous literature, we derive the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. A plural forms organization within franchising networks enables to manage the diversity 
of goals; therefore the presence of company-owned units in franchising networks generates a 
higher performance. 
 
2.3. Brand-name value and performance in distribution networks 
In addition with the agency literature regarding the downstream moral hazard in producers-
retailers relationships, several theoretical (Lal, 1990; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995) and 
empirical works (Lafontaine, 1992; Agrawal and Lal, 1995; Scott, 1995; Vazquez, 2005) 
dealing with franchising and distribution networks show that the moral hazard is two-sided, 
and draw attention to the important role of the upstream firm. 
Branded-networks, as business-format franchising, are indeed based on the location of an 
intangible asset, namely the upstream firm’s brand and concept. It is even possible to say that 
supplying and promoting the brand is the main task devoted to the upstream unit. The 
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promotional efforts increase the brand-name value, in other words the reputation of the 
network. In doing so, they positively affect the sales of the network. 
The advantage of using a brand-name compared with wholly-independent retailing finds 
evidence in Williams (1999)’s empirical results, based on US data, which suggest that 
franchisees’ profits would be lower if the studied downstream units would not be part of a 
franchised network. 
The importance of the brand-name is illustrated by the history of franchising networks, 
which, as pointed out by Mathewson and Winter (1985), have developed from the 50s, along 
with the development of national brands. This importance is emphasized by Windsperger 
(2004) who studies the influence of brand-name assets on the allocation of decision rights in 
the Austrian franchise systems, and by Kidwell et al. (2007), dealing with the free-riding 
relating to the brand-name reputation on Norwegian franchising data. 
As mentioned by Lafontaine and Shaw (2005), all brands are not equal, and their value 
depends on a long term effort of the upstream firm. This idea is consistent with Barthélemy 
(2008)’s empirical work on French data which highlights the influence of the brand-name on 
the financial performance of franchised chains. 
From this analytical context, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3. The upstream firm’s effort determines the brand-name value; therefore a higher effort 
from the upstream firm generates a higher network performance. 
 
2.4. Overview of the research model 
Figure 1 illustrates the overview of our proposed model, composed of three complementary 
hypotheses concerning the determinants of networks performance (H1-H3), and a background 
hypothesis (H0), seeing the market share, the international development, and the expansion 
rate of distribution networks as three indicators of the same latent variable, namely the 
networks performance. 
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Fig. 1 Overview of the model 
 
  
 
 
Franchising network       + H1                                                                                         International dev. 
                                                                            H0 
Plural form network         + H2                                                                                                              Market share  
                                
                                     + H3                                                                                                                Expansion rate 
Upstream firm’s effort                                                                                                       
  
 
 
3. The data 
In this study we use recent primary data provided by the INSEE regarding the French 
distribution networks over seven units. The networks, and more precisely the upstream firms 
or structures, were surveyed by means of a paper questionnaire sent by post. Several surveys 
were conducted between 2006 and 2008.  
As a result of the matching and of the work of retropolation, our cross-sectional dataset 
refers to the year 2007. It is exhaustive and covers all of the subsectors within the retail and 
services sectors. The sample consists of 1202 networks. 
 
3.1. Dependant variables 
The three indicators of networks performance are defined as follows.  
The market share is the proportion of the network turnover in the total sector turnover: 
  	
  
 
	
  
 
  
The study takes into account 21 sectors, as presented in Table 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution Network Performance 
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Table 2 
A wide range of retail and services sectors 
 
 
Sectors 
 
 
% 
in sample 
Accommodation 2.1 
Food and beverage service activities 6.4 
Travel agencies 7.8 
Other services activities 1.6 
Real estate agencies 2.9 
Renting (motor vehicles, personal goods) 1.9 
Information technology and computer service activities 0.6 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles, sale of parts and accessories 2.1 
Large-scale food retailing stores 2.3 
Personal service activities 6.5 
Personal and household goods (except clothes and shoes) 7.9 
Cultural and recreation goods stores 4.6 
Home equipment stores 7.4 
Do-it-yourself stores and flower stores 5.5 
Department and general stores 1.3 
Small-scale food retailing stores and frozen products stores 1.4 
Delicatessen, bakery 1.8 
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores 4.1 
Other sundry specialized retail sale 6.6 
Clothes stores 17.9 
Shoe stores 7.3 
Data from INSEE surveys (year 2007) 
 
As mentioned in Table 2, the two main sectors in terms of the number of networks are 
“clothes stores” and “personal and household goods”. 
The international development of the network is measured, for each network, as the ratio 
between the number of outlets abroad and the total number of the network outlets: 
   
  
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
Finally, the performance is measured with the expansion rate of the networks as a third 
indicator. Using cross-sectional variables, it is not possible to take into account the evolutions 
over time. However, for each network, we construct an index of the expansion rate with the 
total number of outlets in the network divided by the age of the network: 
 
    
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
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3.2. Independent variables 
Related to hypothesis 1, the network type is introduced in the study as an explanatory 
variable. Five organizational forms are distinguished in the sample. Each of them relates to 
distribution networks with a common brand for the outlets. These different types of 
distribution networks are: predominantly integrated networks, mainly composed of company 
owned units, business-format franchising networks, retailer or service provider cooperatives 
where the upstream unit in charge of the promotion of the common brand belongs to the 
downstream units,  and networks organized with brand license contracts, close to business-
format franchising but less constraining for the downstream units. Usually, franchised 
networks enclose a part of company owned units. In our sample, two types of franchising 
networks are taken into account according to the proportion of the network turnover achieved 
by franchised versus owned units: predominantly franchised and franchised mixed networks. 
Table 3 presents these different kinds of networks. Each network is allocated a type 
according to the proportion of the network turnover achieved by the different categories of 
outlets in the network.  The algorithm tests successively the condition in the second column of 
Table 3, and stops as soon as a condition is true: 
 
Table 3 
Five types of networks 
 
Network type Proportion of  the sample 
turnover 
Condition 
Predominantly 
integrated 
 
69% More than 50 % of the network turnover is achieved by company-owned units 
Predominantly 
franchised  
 
7% More than 50 % of the network turnover is achieved by franchised units 
Franchised 
mixed 
 
8% Between 20 % and 50 % of  the network turnover  is achieved by franchised units 
Cooperative  14% More than 50 % of the network-turnover is achieved by outlets member of a cooperative 
Brand license 
 
3% 
More than 50 % of the network-turnover is achieved by outlets with a brand-license 
contract 
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From hypothesis 1, we expect that franchised networks provide higher performances than 
the other forms. 
In line with hypothesis 2, the presence of company-owned units in the network is taken into 
account as an explanatory variable for networks performance. This variable is measured as the 
number of company-owned units divided by the total number of outlets in the network: 
 
  
   ! 
 "    
  
  
 
This ratio is commonly used in the empirical literature on franchise data as an indicator of 
the extent to which a firm franchises its outlets (Castrogiovanni et al. 2006). However, most 
of the time, it is studied as a dependent variable, which is not the case here. Deriving from 
hypothesis 2, the expectation concerning this variable is that the presence of company-owned 
units within networks of independent retailers, ie dual distribution, favors the performance.  
The third core explanatory variable is related to hypothesis 3. The upstream firm’s effort in 
the vertical relationship is taken into account with an index resulting from the compilation of 
six qualitative variables (see Table 4). Each of these qualitative variables represents a specific 
form of involvement by the upstream firm. In some networks the upstream firm defines itself 
the layout of the downstream outlets and is in charge of the advertizing campaigns. The 
upstream imposes teams training and the different services that the outlet offers to the 
customers. Finally, the upstream firm may choose an information strategy concerning the 
sales tracking or the diffusion of the retailers’ performances within the network.  
Each qualitative variable is coded from 0-2 (0 = no, 1 = yes partially, 2 = yes totally; the 
maximum value is 12). The higher the value of this variable, the higher the level of 
involvement is of the upstream firm in the vertical relationship. 
A greater performance is expected from a greater upstream effort. 
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Table 4 
Construction of the proxy variable upstream effort 
 
Aggregation of the six following qualitative variables : 
Layout of the retail outlet 
Teams training 
Advertizing and promotion 
Definition of the services to customers 
Sales tracking 
Diffusion of information concerning the network performance  
Minimum : 0 maximum : 12 
 
3.3. Control variables 
The dummy variable Retail/Services enables to control for the influence on the networks 
performance of operating in retail versus services sectors. Such a variable was previously 
introduced by Dant et al. (2008). This distinction between the retail and services sectors is in 
line with Perrigot (2006)’s empirical results which underline significant differences between 
retailing and services in the French franchising sector. As the data relate to a developed 
country, it is relevant to predict that services sectors are more dynamic and generate more 
performance than the retail activities.  
Finally, the dummy variable other network takes into account the operating by the 
upstream firm of another branded network. The strategic choice to operate simultaneously 
several networks may affect the performance. The impact may be positive, due to a higher 
experience, or negative, if focusing on one specific distribution network appears to be more 
efficient. 
 
3.4. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for all the study variables are provided in Table 5.  
Table 5 
Summary statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
 
Dependant variables 
Market share   1202 0.0191348     0.051123   0.0000104   0.6809489 
Expansion rate 1202 21.06948    159.2495        0 .05    4849.33 
Internationalization rate 1202 0. 1303478   0.2628227          0   0.9967006 
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Independent variables 
Network type      
Predominantly  integrated 1202 0.4825291   0.4999027          0 1 
Predominantly  franchised 1202 0.2171381 0.412469          0 1 
Franchised mixed 1202 0.0740433   0.2619503          0 1 
Cooperatives 1202 0.0873544    0.2824712          0 1 
Brand license 1202 0.046589    0.2108446          0 1 
Company-owned units  1202 0.5939847    0.4471412  0 1 
Upstream effort     1202 0.5174709 0.4999027          0 1 
 
Control variables 
Retail/Services 1202 0.7129784   0 .4525601          0 1 
Other network 1202 0.7287854    0.4447717          0 1 
 
4. Evidence for the relationship between the three indicators 
 
4.1. Method 
The econometric model deriving from the analytical framework can be written as follows: 
 
     #
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Where #

$ is a latent variable with three indicators1: the internationalization 
rate of the network, the network market share, and the expansion rate of the network. 
We propose a specific methodology to highlight the empirical relationship between the 
three indicators, in other words the endogeneity relating to the three dependant variables. 
In the econometric literature, in order to deal with endogeneity, it is suggested to use the 
Hausman test and to compare the estimation results of an OLS and of a two-stage least 
squares model. However, good instrumental variables are not available here due to the cross 
sectional and mainly qualitative data.  For this reason, we use the procedure proposed by 
Gujarati (2004). The two steps process consists first to get the residue vi from the regression 
                                                 
1
 Indicators are observed variables that measure a latent variable. 
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of Y1 with the exogenous variables (in the reduced form)2, then to regress Y2 as a function of  
Y1 and vi. If the coefficient of vi is significant it is then not possible to reject the hypothesis of 
simultaneity. Gujarati (2004) presents this method within a two equations system. We extend 
the process here to the case of a three equations system. More precisely, we test for the 
potential simultaneity regarding the internationalization rate, the expansion rate and the 
market share in the following reduced form system: 
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4.2. Results 
The results of the procedure highlight the endogeneity between the three dependant 
variables, as summarized in Figure # 2.  As shown by this Figure, the results are robust to 
changes concerning the order of the testing procedure: each residue remains significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The reduced form is as follows: ?9)  ;' ( ;):% ( 	%9*  <' ( <):% ( % 4 
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Fig. 2 Endogeneity between the three indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical determinants of networks performance 
5.1. Method 
Taking into account the empirical relationship between the three dependant variables of the 
study, we rewrite the econometric model as a system of simultaneous equations. 
In order to warrant that all the variables of the system are exogenous, we test for each 
equation all the explanatory variables using the procedure previously defined (4.1). For each 
equation of the system, if all the explanatory variables are included, some of them become 
endogenous depending on the equation. Therefore we test all the possible forms of the system 
in order to ensure that the explanatory variables included are exogenous3. The resulting 
empirical model free of endogeneity problem regarding the explanatory variables can be 
written as follows: 
 
                                                 
3
 All the estimation results are available upon request. 
International 
Expansion (ui)       
p=0.000*** 
Market Share (ui)               
p=0.036** 
International (vi) 
p=0.000*** 
 
Expansion 
Market Share (vi) 
p=0.000*** 
 
International (wi) 
p=0.046** 
Expansion (wi) 
p=0.052* 
Market Share 
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The organizational form: “franchised mixed” serves here as the reference. 
 
This system satisfies the order conditions. The first equation is exactly identified; the 
second and third equations are over identified (see Appendix). In this case, the two-stage least 
squares or the three-stage least squares methods can be used. 
We test for the potential multicolinearity and hetorecedasticty in each equation, like Ackert 
and Athanassakos (2003). The tests reveal a problem of hetorecedasticty4. In practice, if there 
is no hetorecedasticty problem between the errors of each equation, the two-stage least 
squares and the three-stage least squares methods provide the same estimators. This is not the 
case here. For this reason, the three-stage least squares estimates should be preferred.  
 
5.2. Results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Estimation results - simultaneous equations for networks performance 
 
 
Variable 
 
Two-stage least squares 
 
Three-stage least squares 
 
 
Internationalization rate   
 
Other network .0198395    
(0.017031) 
.0180542 
(0.0163912) 
 
Retail/Services -.0585595*** 
(0.019653) 
-.0619913***    
(0.0208524) 
 
Upstream effort -.0342793     
(0.0289239) 
-.0297871  
(0.0188955) 
 
Retailer cooperatives -.0543015**    
(0.0376679) 
-.0584758**    
(0.0287711) 
 
Brand License  -.0515261    
(0.03060721) 
-.0502604     
(0.037445) 
                                                 
4
 The Brush-Pagan test is performed 
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Predominantly franchised .0717417**    
(0.0180458) 
.0690512**     
(0.03051505) 
 
Predominantly integrated  .0005524    
(0.0211833) 
.0015839    
(0.017932)   
 
Constant .1769447***    
(0.0210878) 
.1783752***    
(0.0207427) 
 
 
Expansion rate 
 
 
 
 
Retail/Services -32.95786***    
(10.43239) 
-33.19872***    
(10.40524) 
 
Retailer cooperatives -15.48824    
(17.60851) 
-18.3978 
(17.53543) 
 
Brand License  2.422808     
(22.70735) 
2.509925     
(22.61323) 
 
Predominantly franchised 6.409633     
(18.67029) 
4.985144 
(18.59324) 
 
Integrated  -22.56448**     
(10.7958) 
-21.58793**     
(10.75214)     
 
Constant 56.22124***    
(10.17937) 
56.27733***   
(10.14907) 
 
Market Share 
 
  
Other network -.0056336*    
(0.0030349) 
 
-.0057003* 
(0.0030847)    
Retail/Services -.0109318***    
(0.0030349) 
 
-.0109367***     
(0.0030298) 
Company-owned units .0001552***     
(0.0000115) 
 
.0001549***   
(0.0000114) 
Constant .0244456***      
(0.003598) 
 
.0245128***    
(0.003589) 
R2 International 
 
R2 Expansion 
 
R2 Market Share 
 
0.0364 
 
0.0174 
 
0.1436            
0.0363       
 
0.0174 
 
0.1436            
F*,Chi2f International 
 
 
F*,Chi2f Expansion 
 
 
F*,Chi2f Market Share 
6.44 
(0.0000)  
 
4.24    
(0.0008) 
 
66.96    
(0.0000) 
45.03 
(0.0000) 
 
20.85    
(0.0009) 
 
201.76    
(0.0000) 
 
Note: *Significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.                                                      
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The good global significance of the system is highlighted by the p-values for each 
equation. Note that the small R squared obtained do not question the quality of the estimates, 
due to the cross-sectional data, and to the purpose of the three-stage least squares, which is to 
get accurate estimates of the coefficients. This is why a negative or a small R squared is not a 
problem with this estimation method, the focus being on the parameters. 
The estimates relating to the internationalization rate reveal that, as predicted, the 
organizational form of the network has a significant influence on the performance. The sign 
concerning the variable “predominantly franchised” highlights the positive influence of such a 
type of organization for the international expansion of the network. In addition, the results 
suggest that cooperatives, versus “franchised mixed” networks which serve as the reference in 
the estimations, have a negative impact on the first performance indicator. These results are 
consistent with H1. The negative sign concerning the control variable sector suggests that 
services involve a higher performance than retail activities. The hypothesis H3 finds no 
empirical support here. The variable “Upstream effort” has no significant influence. This 
unpredicted result may be due to the construction of the proxie variable.  
 Complementary results are provided by the estimates relating to the expansion rate. Here 
again, the organizational form impacts the performance, and the comment is similar than the 
preceding one concerning cooperatives: the integrated form has a negative influence on the 
expansion rate, contrary to the reference form “franchised mixed”. H1 which relates 
franchising and networks performance finds here again an empirical support. The results 
concerning the expansion rate highlight once again the significant influence of the sector and 
the positive impact of the services versus the retail activities.  
This is also the case within the third group of estimates dealing with the market share. 
Thus, whatever the performance criterion taken into account, the influence of the sector is 
significant and the results indicate that services versus retail activities favor networks 
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performance. This result could be explained by the fact that retailing networks represents 77% 
of our sample: distribution networks would be well established in this sector, and would be 
expanding in the services. In this case our results would illustrate an ongoing dynamics. The 
equation for the market share includes the variable “Company-owned units”, confronting then 
H2 to data. The estimation results are consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that company-
owned units have a significant and positive influence. Considering the p-value 10%, the 
control variable “Other network” has a significant and negative impact on the performance. 
This result means that a higher performance in terms of market share results from the focus of 
the upstream firm on one specific network. 
 
6. Results and Discussion  
6.1 Findings  
The performance of distribution networks can be measured through different approaches. In 
this empirical paper we take into account three criteria: the internationalization rate of the 
network, the market share and the expansion rate.  
Empirical evidence is provided concerning the simultaneity of these three criteria, which 
are studied in the paper as three indicators of the same latent variable; that is the performance 
of the distribution networks. 
The analytical part of the paper surveys the vast literature devoted to franchising and to 
dual distribution. From this framework, several testable propositions are derived, linking the 
networks performance to the five following organizational choices: the type of distribution 
network, regarding five alternative forms in the French system; the level of company-owned 
units in the network; the involvement of the upstream unit in the vertical relationship; the 
type of sector, considering the distinction between services and retail activities; and the 
choice to manage several networks simultaneously. 
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The estimation of a system of simultaneous equations, free of endogeneity regarding the 
explanatory variables, by means of the three-stage least squares method provides robust 
results.  
Except for the involvement of the upstream unit, the estimates highlight the significant 
impact of the organizational choices on the performance at the network level. 
 
6.2. Practical implications 
This paper offers an understanding of the influence of several organizational choices on the 
performance of distribution networks, providing practitioners with a better basis for making 
decisions about the organizational forms in distribution. 
Compared to cooperatives and company-owned networks, franchising appears to be the 
appropriate form when the goal is the extension of the network, in terms of international 
expansion and expansion rate relating to the age of the network. In addition, the paper 
highlights the positive influence on the market share of the presence of company-owned units 
within branded-networks of independent retailers or service providers, that is dual 
distribution. The choice of the sector, regarding the distinction between retailing and services 
impacts also the performance. Our empirical results suggest that services versus retail 
activities favor networks performance.  Finally, evidence is provided that, in terms of market 
share, it is better to focus on a unique distribution network instead of managing several 
networks simultaneously. 
 
6.3. Conceptual implications and further research 
This study contributes to the ongoing literature regarding the influence of the organizational 
forms on the performance (Mazzeo, 2004; Yvrande-Billon and Saussier, 2004; Ciliberto, 
2006; Forbes and Lederman, 2007; Lafontaine et al. 2012). In addition, the paper provides an 
interesting processing of endogeneity, inherent to this issue, in the case of cross sectional 
data. 
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Several limitations which open the way to further research have to be mentioned. 
First, the empirical investigation is limited by the characteristics of the data, mostly 
composed of categorical variables. In addition, our analysis focuses on a single year. This 
approach could be complemented by estimations on panel data in order to highlight fixed 
effects and evolutions. 
Second, the study distinguishes only two general sectors; retail versus services. The good 
results regarding this variable call for a more detailed sector-based analysis. 
Finally, it would be interesting to take into account financial performance criteria in order 
to see if the results obtained here concerning the influence of the organizational choices can 
be generalized to other performance criteria. 
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Appendix – Identification and order conditions 
  
 
Before the estimation of the model it is necessary to check for the identification and order 
conditions in the system. Concerning the order conditions, the criterion is as follows: 
 
DE F    F 1 
>! "
""
E F  G  F 1 	
 "
""
E F  H  F 1 
 "
""
 4  
 
Equation K k K-k Relationship m-1 Identification 
International 5 4 1 = 1 Exactly identified 
Expansion 5 2 3 < 1 Over identified 
Market 
Share 
5 3 2 < 1 Over identified 
 
M: endogenous variables in the model 
m: endogenous variables in an equation 
K: number of predetermined variables in the model 
k: number of predetermined  variables in an equation 
